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NATURE OF THE KIND OF CASE, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant s representation of the nature of the
1

case and disposition of the case by the lower court is essen.ti a 11 y correct.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State seeks affirmation of the judgment; provided that this Court adopts the legal premise of the District
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Court in finding liability on the part of the State.
The State, however, does not abandon its claim
that it should have been dismissed as a party to this
action, and asks this Court to reverse the determination
of liability on the part of the State.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
While Appellant's Statement of Fact is correct,
it perhaps should be somewhat expanded in order to more
accurately treat problems relating to assumptions of
risk and comparative negligence.

For these reasons, the

State will view the facts in a slightly different way.
Kevin Yost, Ronald Sills and Steve Hammon had
been friends for about two years, and while all three were
min6rs, they had drunk together and had combined driving
and drinking at times prior to the date of the accident
(R. 181-184, 256-257).

Yost had started drinking when he

was thirteen or fourteen and drunk beer, wine and whiskey
on prior occasions (R. 256).
After the three young men left the high school
parking lot, there is some conflict in testimony as to the
time involved and sequence of purchases of beer and wine.
It is apparent that no vendor asked Hammon for
I.D. when he made purchases.

Apparently, Hammon looked

21 or over according to the testimony of both Sills and

-2-
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Yost, since each of them had seen Hammon purchase beer
and cigarettes on other occasions without being asked for
identification (R. 181, 258).

Both Sills and Yost had

had drivers training and knew the effects of alcohol on
drivers (R. 184, 262-263), and Yost made no objection to
Hammon's driving and drinking (R. 263).

Yost was just

having a good time and paid no attention to how Hammon
drove.

Both Sills and Yost had driven with Hammon when

all three were pretty drunk (R. 190).
When the truck arrived at the liquor store,
Hammon parked in back of the State store (R. 297).
testified that he had drunk one beer.
State store alone.
whether the

cler~

Hammon

He went into the

He asked the clerk (but doesn't remember
was male or female) where the wine was,

put down his money and the five fifths of wine, picked up
his purchase and change and left (R. 297-298).

Yost and

Sills had waited in the truck which had been parked off to
the right side of the door and Yost could not see into the
store through the

~oor

and did not think there were windows

in the back of the store (R. 263).
Yost, Hammon and Sills drove and drank after
leaving the State store.

Eventually, they arrived at Chris's.

Sills testified that he and Hammon entered Chris's while Yost
filled the truck with gas.

At that time Sills testified he

was getting ''fairly drunk" and Hammon was getting drunk too
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(R. 173, 174).

All of "us" were staggering a little bit,

and Hammon's speech was worse than it usually was (R. 174).
Hammon bought two six-packs at Chris's from a lady who did
not ask for any identification.
As Appellant has stated in his brief, an accident
later occurred in which Yost was seriously injured.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

THE STATE HAS NOT WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

This argument is based on the theory that Utah's
method of control of liquor is essentially an exercise of
its governmental power and that its "monopoly," which admittedly produces income, is incidental to its exercise of
_po 1 ice power.
When we deal with liquor law, we find that every
state

~as

adopted methods of imposing regulations for the

sale and service o1 liquor and methods of tapping the liquor
trade for money for the benefit of the public fisc.
variations are found in the laws of the states.

Great

Perhaps

the two extreme positions tan be set forth simply.

The

first position is that liquor is viewed as is any other
business, except that high license fees are imposed on wholesales, bottle stores, and retail outlets where liquor is sold
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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by the drink.

In addition, excise taxes are imposed on

bottle sales.

The other position completely controls the

trade by establishing a state monopoly on whole-sale and
bottle-sale outlets.

The revenues which are generated by

licensing and taxation may then take on the form of sales
profit.
We might ask what is the reason for the extreme
differences in approach?

Clearly, it is not a difference

in the ability to produce revenue stnce licenses and excise
taxes can be made high enough to produce whatever liquor
revenue is desired.

The essential difference is that a

state monopoly on the trade permits an easier exercise of
the police power.
This act shall be deemed an exercise of
the police powers of the state for the protection of the public peace, health and morals;
to prevent the recurrence of abuse associated
with saloons; to.eliminate the evils of unlicensed
and unlawful manufacture, selling and disposing of
alcoholic beverages; and all provisions of this
act shall be liberally construed for the attainment of these purposes. Utah Code Annotated,
Se.ction 31-1-2. (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the declaration of purposes
set out in Section 31-1-2 does not seek by this legislation
to protect public safety.

The Legislature has made a choice

to enforce the liquor laws by criminal sanction and by revocation of licenses for violations of the statutes and rules
of the commission.

For example, criminal penalties are pro-

vided for violations; and, for example, Section 32-1-32.4,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah Code Annotated, provides for revocation or suspension
of licenses.

If beer is sold to a minor, Section 32-4-17,

Utah Code Annotated

provides that in addition to any other

penalty, the person's license to sell beer will be revoked
or suspended for a period of not less than 30 days.

Sections

32-7-13 through 32-7-15.5 and 32-7-24 contain the general
criminal sanctions.

Even advertising by the commission,

manufacturers and package stores is prohibited.

It should

also be noted that purchase by a minor is a Class B misdemeanor.

Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated, makes it

clear that sovereign immunity is not waived when a governmental entity is engaged ·in the exercise and discharge of a
governmental function.
It is submitted that as a part of the exercise of
its police power, the. State chose to make sales of liquor
in its own stoies to prevent various transactions in liquor
by private citizens at various stages of the liquor trade.
In Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 605
P.2d 1230, this Court split three to two in determining
whether a municipality was immune from liability in the
operation of a golf course.

While vastly different views

of legislative intent were apparently held by the members
of this Court, it seems evident that the operation of a golf
course by a city is a much different thing than the control
of liquor by the State of Utah.
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The majority opinion defines the test for
determining governmenta 1 immunity to be

11

•••

whether

the activity under consideration is of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed by a government
agency or that it is essential to the core of government."

605 P.2d 1237, emphasis added.
Because the Legislature has so declared, only

the State Liquor Control Commission can sell wine.

Under

the now apparently overruled doctrine of distinguishing
governmental activity from proprietary activity, the
activity remains governmental because no private interests
can legally sell liquor (excluding beer), the activity goes
to the core of regulating the sale of liquor, and the production of revenue is incidental since equal revenue could
be produced from license fees and excise taxes.
Unless the rule in Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517,
can be extended to this fact situation, the State remains
immune whatever the liability of its employee may be for
making a sale to the minor (which sale will be discussed
more hereafter).

In Frank there can be no claim that the

act was other than ministerial.

A State Liquor Store em-

ployee is to do several things in making a sale.

He is not

to sell liquor to a minor nor to an intoxicated person.
Other than that, he is to collect money and ring it up.

-7-
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The first distinction in this case is that an employee
who sells liquor to a minor is guilty of a crime.

The

imputation of a crime, or criminal liability, to a principal
is far different than the imputation of negligent acts or
omissions.

It is respectfully submitted that the commis-

sion of a crime is not
ment ...

11

11

•••

within the scope of his employ-

within the meaning of Section 63-30-10, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953.

The writer is hard pressed to believe

t ha t t he St a t e c a n 1 e g a 1 1y h i r e a
arsonist" or a

11

state bootlegger.

11

s t a t e hi t ma n , 11 ·a

11

s ta t e

11

Whatever the liability of the salesperson may be,
crime cannot be imputed to the sovereign on the theory of
respondent superior.

B.

THE PLAINTIFF, THE PURCHASER AND THE.
SELLERS OF LIQUOR ARE IN PARI DELICTO
AND RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED.

A review of the record discloses that the three
young men involved in this case deliberately set out to
violate the criminal law by purchasing liquor and beer in
violation of law.

If any of the defendants are liable at

all, liability arises from selling liquor or beer to minors
who had conspired to make such purchases.

The record shows

that these minors know the effects of alcohol both by education and experience, and had consumed alcoholic beverages
together and had driven with Hammon while he had been drin::ing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on other occasions.
The usual_ policy of the law is to deny relief
inter se to persons in pari delicto as a matter of public
policy.
It might be pointed out that one justification for
the public policy determination could be that defendants,
in cases

s~ch

as this one, are required to prove negatives,

and that the necessity to assemble proof arises long after
the incident which underlies the cause of action.

C.

CONSUMPTION, NOT SALE, OF LIQUOR WAS
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Utah, with some limitations, has adopted the common
law, Section 68-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

There is no

statute which varies the common law rule, which is that in
the liquor-related cases, drinking liquor, not selling liquor,
is the proximate cause of intoxication.
Utah has not enacted a dramshop act or imposed
statutory civil liability upon any seller of liquor for injuries to a third person caused by a customer, although it
would appear obvious that the Utah Legislature has had many
sessions in which to enact such legislation had it chosen

so to do.
No Utah decision exists which has imposed dramshop
liability.

-9-
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a.

Several jurisdictions have judicially imposed
liability upon persons who have served liquor to intoxicated customers who subsequently caused injury to third
persons.
In Vesley v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Calif., 1971),
the Supreme Court of California stated that the traditional
common law rule would deny recovery against a vendor of
alcoholic beverages for providing drinks to a customer who
as a result of intoxication injures a third person upon the
ground that furnishing the alcoholic beverage is not the
proximate cause of injury, drinking is the proximate cause.
In this case, a tavern owner furnished large quantities of
alcoholic beverages to the driver from about 10:00 p.m. until
5:15 a.m. the next morning and

11

•••

knew that O'Connell was

becoming excessively intoxicated and ... was incapable of
exercising the same degree of volitional control over his
consumption of intoxicants as the average reasonable person,
and ... the only route leaving the Buckhorn Lodge was a very
steep, winding and narrow mountain road and that O'Connell
was going to drive down that road.

Nevertheless, Sager

continued to serve O'Connell alcoholic drinks past the normal
closing time of 2 a.m . . . .

11

498 P.2d 151, 154.

The Court pointed out that 20 states had

abroga~ed

the common law rule by statute but California had not,
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nevertheless California had enacted legislation making it
a misdemeanor to sell, serve or give an alcoholic beverage
to any habitual or common drunkard or any obviously intoxicated person.

The purpose of this legislation was to protect

the people of the state.

The person serving liquor to an

intoxicated person should foresee the risk of harm to others.
The Court then overruled prior inconsistent cases.

The Court

did not rule or indicate a ruling as to whether liability
would be similarly imposed on a social host who served liquor
to a guest.
In· 1976, the California

Suprem~

Court, in Bernhard

v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, held a Nevada tavern liable which
had

se~ved

liquor to intoxicated customers who drove back to

California and had an auto-motorcycle accident in which plaintiff was injured. ·The conflicts of law question was resolved
in favor of the forum state even though Nevada does not impose
liabiiity under a dramshop theory

beca~se

Harrah's advertises

for California customers, it is foreseeable that intoxicated
customers would drive.on California roads, and it is illegal
to sell an alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person in
Nevada.

Thus, the law of the state which should be applied

is that of the

st~te

whose interest in the public policy ex-

pressed in the law would be more significantly impaired.
In Campbell v. Carpenter, 566 P.2d 893 (1977), the
Oregon Supreme court, in a case in which a bartender continued
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.

to serve beer to a customer after she was visibly intoxicated and had reason to know that after becoming intoxicated
she would probably drive away in her automobile, held the
tavern owner liable for plaintiff's damages.

This was the

first Oregon case departing from the common law rule, and
the reasoning was essentially the same as the California
decisions, that the tavern owner's negligence is in failing
or refusing to foresee an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
b.

Other states have had the opportunity to adopt a
''common 1 aw" rule of dramshop 1iabi1 i ty but have refused so
to do.

Some, if not most of the courts that have refused to

adopt the California-Oregon theory, have done so on the basis
that the courts have no proper function in changing the common
law, and if a new liability is to be created, this is for the
Legislature to determine.

Many of the cases also hold that

statutes or ordinances declaring it illegal to serve intoxicated people are to regulate business, not to protect the
general public.

The cases also follow the common law ratio-

nale of proximate causation.

A comparison has been made that

it is illegal to drive while under the influence of alcohol
and that this is the statute designed to protect the public
from the drunk.

A few illustrative cases are set out as

examples.
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In a -1971 Wyoming case similar to the facts
alleged here, Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, plaintiff, a
minor, sought recovery from the owner of a bar on the
theory that the bartender had sold liquor to another minor
who had become intoxicated and drove his car into a school
building doing injury to the plaintiff who was a minor.
It is illegal to sell liquor to a minor, and the employee's
negligence was presumed.

Nevertheless, the Court stated

the absence of common law liability, referred to the dramshop statutes in some jurisdictions, and held that whether
there should be a change of the common law rule was up to
the Legislature.
In Thompson v. Bryson, 505 P.2d 572 (1973), the
Arizona Supreme Court held that sale of an alcoholic beverage
to an intoxicated person does not in and of itself create a
civil liability on the dispenser for injuries sustained at
·the hands of the customer by a third person.

In this case,

the defendants had served liquor to a customer, Whitmore,
previously unknown to them.

Whitmore and another customer,

Thompson, had been in an argument, and Thompson had slapped
Whitmore.

One of the owners broke up the altercation, the

customers shook hands and continued to drink.

Whitmore left,

later returned with a shotgun, and killed Thompson.

Arizona

declares it illegal to serve liquor to an intoxicated or disorderly person or illow him to remain at a licensed premise.
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It has no dramshop act or civil damage act.

In Collier

v. Stamatis, 162 P.2d 125 (1945), the Court had held that
the purpose of the statute was to regulate business rather
than to enlarge civil liability.

The Court noted that

California in Vesley v. Sager, supra, had reached a different result.

The Court further held that there must be

a duty owed to plaintiffs by defendants and that there must
also be proximate cause, and an essential element to any
liability is foreseeability.

It held in these circumstances

that foreseeability of Whitmore's conduct was absent,
but assuming negligence in selling liquor to Whitmore for
his own ingestion, proximate cause could not be established.
In Marchindo v. Roper, 563 P.2d 1160

(1977}, the

New Mexico Supreme Court considered a case in which the trial
court had dismissed plaintiff's claim against a tavern owner
who had served liquor to a woman who was allegedly known to
defendant as a common drunk and who had a blood-alcohol
reading of 0.35% at the time the customer ran down the plaintiff pedestrian.

The Court of Appeals overruled Hall v.

Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966), and thus established a "common law dramshop" liability.

The Supreme Court

determined that the trial court was correct and held that
the Legislature should determine whether or not there should
be dramshop legislation, not the Court, and that the Legislature had not addressed the issue either affirmatively or

-14-
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negatively.

The Court recognized that the dramshop

liability concept has been imposed judicially in many
states, and that an equal number of state courts had
refused to impose liability.

The Court observed,

" ... being certain that our Legislature must be aware
of the many problems of alcohol abuse and will deal with
the problem presented here, we are hesitant to act at
this time and hope that it will address this issue in
the near future, either for or against extending tavern
keepers' liability to third persons.

We do not, however,

feel that it would be improper for the Court to address
this· issue in the future if the Legislature chooses not
to act.

11

563 P.2d 1160, 1162.
The Nevada Supreme Court in Hamm v. Carson City

Nugget , Inc . , 4 50 P . 2 d 3 58 ( 19 69 ) , he 1 d that c i vi 1 1 i ab i 1 i ty
of a tavern keeper who unlawfully sold liquor to a driver
should be extended to a third party by a legislative act,
if at all, and not by the Court.

The Court held that the

common law is applicable if not in conflict with constitutional or statutory demands.

The common law imposed no

dramshop liability, because consumption of liquor, not sale,
was the proximate cause of damages.

The Court stated that

the common law rule had been eroded in recent years and
that some courts recognize a cause of action because sale
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of liquor initiates a foreseeable chain of events for
which the tavern owner may be held liable.
has been rejected by other courts.

The trend

The choice for Nevada

(this being a case of first impression) could be supported
by case authority either way.

It is essentially a public

policy choice whether the Court or Legislature should
declare the conclusion.

The statute making it unlwaful

to sell drinks to intoxicated customers is to regulate
business since a statute imposes some limited civil liability for selling liquor to a minor, and the legislative
intent is clear.
It appears clear that when liability has been
imposed on a seller of liquor, the seller has been in a
position to control consumption.
Since liquor cannot be consumed in a State store,
the State employee cannot control consumption.
D.

THE SALE OF FIVE FIFTHS OF WINE IS A .
WHOLE-SALE, NOT A RETAIL SALE.

Even in states which have imposed dramshop liability,
we can find no case in which liability has been imposed on a
wholesaler.

The only case we have discovered in which a "whole-

saler" was liable involved a finding that the wholesaler was
actually engaged in retail selling under the Illinois Dramshop
Act.

In Peterson v. Jack Donelson Sales Co., 281 N.E.2d 753,
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4 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1972), the "wholesaler 11 provided
eight one-half barrels of beer for a union picnic in a
truck which was set up to chill the beer and serve it.
Eight hundred cups and ice were also provided.

While

the district Court found for the defendant, the decision
was reversed, the appellate Court holding that the
s a 1e r

11

11

whole-

s e t up a d rams ho p i n fa c L
The basic justification for dramshop statutes

or findings of liability lay decisions is that it is foreseeable by the seller that the customer will become intoxicated and is likely to- injure someone as a result.

Liability

has not been.imposed on wholesalers because a wholesaler cannot foresee that a particular individual will drink to excess
in the case of a multi-bottle sale, nor can the wholesaler
control consumption.
In the circumstances of this case, the clerk could
not foresee that Hammon (the only one who came in the store)
intended to immediately drink five (5) bottles of wine.
There is no evidence that the clerk saw the truck or the
other people involved.

E.

THE COURT, FOR REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY,
SHOULD NOT CREATE NEW LIABILITY.

It is respectfully submitted that the Courts have
a duty to uphold the traditional separation of powers in our

-17-
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scheme of government and should permit the Legislature
to change the law when it perceives a social need to do
so.
In this case, unlike many of the cases cited
above, the State does not compete with other bars or
taverns for customers.

It will not make any substantial

difference to the profit of its operation if liquor is
purchased one place or another since all alcoholic beverages,
except beer, are sold for a State-set price.

Even if liquor

is sold in a restaurant or club, there is no mark-up.permitted.
In other States,
taverns, there may

~e

where liquor is sold in bars or

a substantial profit-motive to sell

drinks to intoxicated customers or to minors.

The owner of

a bar may be motivated by a profit-incentive to serve or
permit his employees to serve such customers.

A bartender

might be motivated by the possibility of tips to make such
sales even if the owner (if absent) did not want such patronage.

Dramshop Acts, by imposing liability, tend to regulate

the business of keeping dramshops.
If an examination is made of cases in which dramshop liability is imposed (whether by statute or not), several
factors are uniformly present.

The seller has directly sold

liquor to a person who is drinking where the seller can observe
the consumption of liquor by the customer, and may determine
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whether the customer is or is becoming intoxicated.
The seller can foresee the probable consequences of the
conduct of the person he has served, and the sale, if not
the direct proximate cause of injury, can be foreseen as
a substantial contributing cause of an injury to the pub1i c .

In the jurisdictions imposing liability there is
the additional reasoning that the law exists to protect
the public safety, as distinguished from the public peace,
he~lth

and morals, which Section 31-1-2, Utah Code Annotated

sets as Utah's reasons for enactment of the Liquor Control
Act.
Utah has determined to enforce its liquor laws
and regulations by its criminal laws.

It would seem apparent

that it could have imposed dramshop liability on itself if it
chose sci to do.

However, the method chosen by the State to

dispense liquor is obviously inconsistent with the dramshop
act approach.

The State has no need to impose liability on

itself to regulate its sale of liquor.

It does not compete

with any other proprietor for business and has no competitive
profit motive.

Its employees are salaried State employees

whose income does not depend on the number of sales a clerk
rings up, nor do such employees receive tips as do bartenders:
waiters or. waitresses in bars or taverns.

It is illegal to

consume alcohol on the premises of a State store (as in
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Clearfield), and the clerk has no opportunity to observe
consumption, or know where, when or whether a customer
will drink the liquor sold after he leaves the store.
While the Legislature has authorized the sale
of alcoholic beverages in restaurants and clubs, and has
also authorized the sale of beer in restaurants, clubs,
taverns and stores of various kinds, to some extent at
least there may be some reasons of policy which might
prompt the Legislature to impose some dramshop-type
liability upon owners of such establishments since they
compete for customers and might be in a position to
regulate consumption.

POINT II
IF THE STATE IS LIABLE FOR THE INJURY
TO YOST, THE TRIAL COURT HAS PROPERLY
APPORTIONED RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
The State does not hereby abandon its position that
the State should not be held liable for the injuries sustained
by Yost.
In order to find liability on the part of the State,
the trial Court had to find the sale of five fifths of wine
to Hammon to be negligent.

Plaintiff Yost's attorney at trial

did not impute negligence to the State because the sale to a
minor was a violation of law (R. 337), rather that the sale
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was unreasonable .because Hammon did not. appear to be of
age and I.D. was not demanded (R. 338).

Assuming, arguendo,

that the sale itself was negligent, the Court had to find
that at least to some degree the clerk either did or should
have foreseen the possible harm to third persons which might
result from the sale to Hammon.

It is clear that at the

time of purchase at the State store Hammon was not intoxicated, that he

ent~red

the store alone, and that his truck

was parked in a position which would have

the

~recluded

clerk from observing either the truck or the people in the
truck.

The

11

foreseeability

11

of injury in these circumstances

would largely be confined to the observation of Hammon only.
By contrast with the situatio'n at the State store,
the testimony is clear that two of the three minors entered
the premises at Chris's and the other minor, Yost, was immediately outside putting gasoline in the truck.

The testi-

mony also shows that by this time Hammon and Sills were both
intoxicated.

Nevertheless, beer was sold to Hammon under

circumstances in which the vendor had to observe Hammon and
Sills and knew they were operating a vehicle since gasoline
was also purchased.

In these circumstances it is submitted

that the condition of .Hammon at the time of the sale of beer
and the knowledge that gasoline had been purchased made it
far more foreseeable that further intoxication would make
the likelihood of an accident much more probable.

The Court
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properly found this sale to be an act of gross negligence
evidencing a total disregard for the consequences.
There is no real question about the liability
of Hammon who admittedly knew that he was intoxicated and
was directly responsible for driving off the road.
Yost knew the effects of drinking from three years
of personal experience and from education.

He willingly

entered into the party, and evidenced no effort or desire
to leave at any point.

He knew what he was doing and assumed

whatever risk was involved.

Both Yost and Sills contributed

money to the purchases made.
The trial Court correctly concluded that the determination of comparative negligence was essentially a
question of fact.
sets out

i~,its

ed its decision.

The Memorandum Opinion (R. 142-147) clearly

Conclusion the method by which the Court reachThe Court first determined the comparative

negligence from the point of view of causation alone (R. 143),
then from the point of view of

11

fault,

11

meaning departure or

deviation from expected standards alone (R. 144), and finally
from consideration of causation and culpability together (R.

146}.
If this Court adopts the negligence theory which is
the basis of the decision of the trial Court, the State has
no reason to find fault with the apportionment of comparative
negligence made by the Court under any of the three methods

- 22-
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of determination so candidly set out in the Memorandum
Opinion, and frankly agrees with the balancing test
utilized.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully submits that its Motion
for Summary Judgment of Dismissal should have been granted
by the trial Court for the reasons set out in Point I.
If this Court concludes that the State is liable,
the State believes that the decision of the District Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 10th day of September,
1980.

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

This is to certify that two copies of the· foregoing
Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard Richards,
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 2408 Van Buren Avenue,
Ogden, Utah 84401, and to Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos, Perkins
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Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, this
l~th day of September, 1980.
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